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ARTICLE
Hiring leaders: Inference and disagreement about
the best person for the job
Konstantinos Giannakas1, Murray Fulton2 & Tala Awada3
ABSTRACT Hiring is a critical determinant of organizational performance and has received
considerable attention in economics where the focus is on identifying who is the best person
for the job (an adverse selection problem) and ensuring that the person hired has incentives
to behave in a desirable manner (a moral hazard problem). The implicit assumption in this
literature is that everyone agrees on what constitutes the “best candidate.” In this paper we
show that the economics literature fails to recognize that people will generally disagree over
“what is best?” Answering this question requires people to make inferences about the
environment the organization expects to experience in the future and to match this envir-
onment with leader characteristics. Given the idiosyncratic nature of inference, there will be
disagreement on the “best person for the job,” even when everyone shares the same goals.
The purpose of this paper is to outline why conflict regarding the most desirable person for
the job emerges in rapidly changing environments and how this conflict is different from
conflict that arises from self-interest and the presence of decision-making biases. The paper
shows that conflict from inference, if properly dealt with, can actually improve decision-
making, and what can be done to create the right conditions for this to occur. The paper also
shows why hiring always involves an element of luck.
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Remember “the best person for the job?” The person that
everyone was looking for to lead the organization through
this critical time. The person that, in the end, few thought
they got. Remember how, as choices were being made,
many of us on the selection committee were left wondering,
“What are those other members thinking?”
Given the background and knowledge of the committee
members, how could we end up not choosing the right
person? Why did some of us feel that other candidates
could have done the job so much better? Why did my
colleagues not see that the organization and the times
needed someone else? Could they not see past their self-
interest? What were they thinking?
Introduction
If the above sounds familiar it is because in rapidly changing
environments the hiring process for leaders is typically char-
acterized by differently held views by those on the hiring com-
mittee regarding the needs and demands of the job and hence of
the most desirable person for the job, even when committee
members share the same goals and objectives for their organi-
zation and are not motivated by self-interested concerns. Since
the hiring of a leader is a critical decision for an organization, the
conflict and disagreement among the members of the hiring
committee cannot be ignored and some process is needed to
resolve this conflict. While some processes are better than others
at coping with this conflict and even using it to advantage, the
process chosen will not always yield the best choice for the future
that emerges; as a consequence, hiring always involves an element
of luck, a roll of the dice. The purpose of this paper is to outline
why conflict regarding the most desirable person for the job
emerges in rapidly changing environments and how this conflict
is different from conflict that arises from self-interest and the
presence of decision-making biases. The paper shows that conflict
from inference, if properly dealt with, can actually improve
decision-making, and what can be done to create the right con-
ditions for this to occur. The paper also shows why hiring always
involves an element of luck.
When hiring a leader, the people on the hiring committee face
two distinct problems. One problem is that of information
asymmetry, where the candidates know things about themselves
and their actions that the people hiring do not. This problem is
well known and has been examined extensively in the economics
and management literatures. The other problem is the idiosyn-
cratic inferences that need to be made about the future and is the
source of the different views that are held by the members of the
hiring committee and the subsequent conflict about the best
leader that emerges.
These two problems arise in different phases of the hiring
process. The inference problem arises in an initial phase when
the hiring committee identifies the environment in which the
organization expects to find itself in the future and determines
the kind of leader that would operate most successfully in
this environment. This phase of the process may be formalized
through activities like a strategic planning process and/or a
SWOT analysis; regardless of the degree of formality, the
organization effectively asks where it wants to be at some
future date and then asks what kind of leader would work
best to achieve this future—i.e., what are the characteristics of the
leader that are needed to best position the organization in the
future.
The information asymmetry problem arises at the second
phase of the hiring process when the leader is hired. This phase
contains two closely related activities, one in which the candidates
are interviewed and a decision is made about who is best for the
job, and one when the chosen candidate is offered an employ-
ment contract. Information asymmetry in the first of these
activities takes the form of an adverse selection problem, while in
the second activity the issue is moral hazard.
The next section of the paper examines the information
asymmetry problem. We start with the information asymmetry
problem to show that this problem assumes that the inference
problem has been answered. While the information asymmetry
problem has been widely studied, the inference problem—which
must be addressed before the information asymmetry problem
can be answered—has received very little attention. We examine
why answering the inference problem is critical to the hiring
process and what might be done to deal with the challenges that
arise in addressing this question.
Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry emerges in the context of a principal-
agent relationship in which a principal hires or appoints an agent
to carry out a task on the principal’s behalf. In the analysis in this
paper, the agent is the leader who is being hired, while the hiring
committee, which is assumed to operate on behalf of an organi-
zation, represents the principal. Information asymmetry captures
the idea that the agent has information that the principal does not
—i.e., some information is hidden from the principal. As a result,
the agent has the potential to undertake decisions that, while
personally beneficial, are not beneficial to the principal. There are
two distinct information asymmetry problems—adverse selection
and moral hazard (Dixit, 2002). Adverse selection focuses on
hidden types, while moral hazard, which has received by far the
most attention, focuses on hidden actions (e.g., effort). Adverse
selection is a potential problem when the candidates are being
interviewed and one is selected, while moral hazard is a potential
problem when a contract is given to the successful candidate. We
start by assuming that the adverse selection problem has been
addressed and examining the moral hazard problem that then
emerges.
Since hiring involves offering the potential leader a contract
that they will accept and that achieves the goals of the principal,
the hiring decision involves the moral hazard problem—namely
how to ensure that the agent acts appropriately (e.g., exerts high
effort, produces high quality goods, manages financial resources
wisely) given that the principal, because of information asym-
metries, is unable to discern costlessly the agent’s actions
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Prendergast, 1999). Failure of the hiring
decision in this context takes the form of being unable to induce
behaviour that is advantageous to the principal.
Two very different theoretical perspectives underpin the ana-
lysis and solutions to the moral hazard problem–agency theory
and stewardship theory. Agency theory, which has dominated the
economics literature and to some extent the management
literature, focuses on getting the monetary incentives correct so
that the self-interest of the agent—the desire to maximize their
own utility—results in advantageous outcomes for the principal.
As Holmstrom (1982, pp 325–326) indicates, “the principal’s role
is not essentially one of monitoring…. The primary role of the
principal is to administer incentives schemes that police agents in
a credible way.” Agency theory has been very influential, pro-
viding the theoretical foundation for corporate governance
models (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and for pay-for-performance
schemes in both the public and private sectors (Langbein, 2010;
Murphy, 2012).
A key insight from the moral hazard literature is that, in the-
ory, the information asymmetry problem can be solved, although
there is a cost involved in doing so. This cost takes the form of the
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incentives that have to be paid to induce the right behaviour by
the agent—these incentives require a rent (a payment over and
above the next best alternative) be paid to the agents to get them
to behave in a desirable manner (Tirole, 1990; Dixit 2002).
Of course, the application of agency theory typically does not
live up to its theoretical potential. One reason is that its imple-
mentation in things such as pay-for-performance schemes is
often overly simplistic and does not pay attention to the host of
factors, including the presence of multiple tasks, multiple objec-
tives and teams that greatly complicate its application (Dixit,
2002). For instance, if the principal has multiple tasks for the
agent to fulfill, then the optimal contract may require the pay-
ment of a fixed wage, rather than performance pay based on one
of the tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991); in fact, the
incorrect use of performance pay can result in behaviour that is
highly detrimental to the principal. The effectiveness of pay-for-
performance and other schemes based on agency theory thus
depends on how well these various dimensions are understood
and captured in the incentives, on errors in the measure of per-
formance, and on the importance to agents of things like
autonomy and relative performance/pay (Langbein, 2010), as well
as on other factors such as the power of the leader to influence the
pay scheme through selection of board members (Bebchuk, Fried
and Walker, 2002), the ability of an organization to properly
understand the cost of paying performance bonuses (Murphy,
2012), and whether a focus on extrinsic monetary incentives
drives out intrinsic incentives, thereby reducing overall perfor-
mance (Frey and Jergen, 2001).
The role of intrinsic incentives in dealing with the potential
opportunism that arises with information asymmetry is recog-
nized in stewardship theory. Stewardship theory assumes that
“The executive manager, …, far from being an opportunistic
shirker, essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good steward of
the corporate assets” (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p 51). In short,
the utility of the leader is closely linked to the success of the
organization, and the focus is not on extrinsic incentives but on
intrinsic incentives; these latter are best created when the leader is
given clear role expectations, and the autonomy, power and
influence to carry out the goals that are shared with the principals
of the organization (Davis et al. 1997). Of course, applying the
insights of stewardship theory does not always result in good
organizational performance. One important reason is that leaders
motivated by extrinsic factors may act opportunistically when
placed in a stewardship environment (Miller and Sardais, 2011;
Zardkoohi et al., 2015).
While the theoretical underpinnings of agency theory and
stewardship theory are very different, and the practical applica-
tions that derive from these underpinnings are often conflicting,
the maintained assumption in each case is that the best leader has
been hired—the key question is how to ensure the best perfor-
mance from that leader. The problem of ensuring that the best
leader has been hired, however, is not straightforward. An
important issue is the information asymmetry associated with
adverse selection.
The core of the adverse selection problem is that agents come
in different types, with different skills and abilities. While the
agents know their skill and ability, or their type, this knowledge is
not available to the principal—indeed this is the information
asymmetry. If the principal only wants to hire high quality agents
and the agents know this, both the principal and high quality
agents can be expected to undertake actions that would truthfully
reveal the agents’ type—the principal undertakes screening
activities to discern the agent’s quality, while the high quality
agent takes actions to signal this quality (Spence, 1981); mean-
while, the low quality agents interested in the job can be expected
to masquerade as a high quality type.
Such strategies, however, are not always undertaken; nor are
they always successful in solving this problem of hidden type. In
some cases it does not pay either the principal or the agents to
differentiate the agents by type. In such cases—i.e., the case of a
pooling equilibrium—the low quality type may be hired. As well,
even when differentiation is optimal, a low quality agent can be
chosen because of unsuccessful screening and/or deficiencies in
signaling.
Determining the characteristics of the best leader
The above characterization of the hiring process is incomplete,
however, since it does not examine the initial phase in which the
hiring committee determines the desirable kind of leader for the
organization. While everybody prefers the “high quality type” to
the “low quality type” and wants to hire “the best person for the
job,” the required identification of the desirable characteristics of
the “high quality type” has received little attention in the litera-
ture—the implicit assumption is that everybody agrees on the
characteristics for the best leader, either explicitly or implicitly
(i.e., they will know them when they see them).
The premise that quality rankings can be agreed upon is, of
course, appropriate for cases where the job performed by the hire
is “simple” or has limited dimensions. Thus, there is likely to be a
high degree of consensus on what constitutes quality in the hiring
of assembly-line workers, secretarial personnel, and perhaps even
middle-level management. In contrast, there is unlikely to be
agreement on what constitutes quality when quality is multi-
dimensional and when what is important is the match between
the characteristics of the hire and the environment in which they
operate. This is particularly the case if the environment is
changing rapidly, so that it is uncertain what the future will look
like.
These complex hiring situations are particularly likely to obtain
when hiring a leader—people such as university presidents,
CEOs, and high-level government bureaucrats—who carries out
multiple and highly diverse tasks that range from being a fig-
urehead to allocating organizational resources (Mintzberg, 1971).
One important resource allocation decision involves distributing
internal effort among different activities; a second involves the
conflicting processes of exploitation of old certainties and the
exploration of new possibilities. These decisions require complex
comparisons across time, institutions, people and risk situations
(March, 1991), which mean that quality (i.e., the best allocation)
has multiple dimensions. In addition, these allocation decisions
require beliefs about what the future will look like. Will the
industry, for instance, continue to move along a similar path to
what has happened historically, or will it move in some new
direction?
Determining what the future might bring is important because
leaders need to be matched with the environment in which they
would best perform. In the business arena, firms can expect to
find themselves in one of at least seven different strategic situa-
tions: start-up; turnaround; profit extraction; dynamic growth;
redeployment of efforts; liquidation and divestiture; and new
acquisitions. The set of requirements for these different strategic
situations differ significantly—for instance, executives in the
start-up phase require team building capabilities and a vision of
the finished business, while those in the profit-extraction phase
need strong administrative skills and a systems orientation
(Gerstein and Reisman, 1983).
The environment in which organizations operate is important
because, as resource dependency theory suggests, poor organi-
zational performance can be the result of a mismatch between
organizational behaviour and the environment (for a review of
resource dependency theory, see Hillman et al. 2009). As Pfeffer
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and Salancik (1978, p 236) argue, this mismatch requires the
replacement of the leader with someone “capable of coping with
the critical problems facing the organization.” In selecting a new
leader, it will thus be important to ensure the leader has the
mindset and skills to create the required alignment between
organizational behaviour and the environment. This alignment
can be expected to be more difficult to achieve the more uncertain
is the environment; as evidence for this view, general manager
turnover is higher the greater is environmental volatility (Guthrie
and Olian, 1991).
As a result of these complexities, the hiring of leaders is any-
thing but straightforward; between one-third and one-half of
CEO hires, for example, end in resignation or firing. The long-
standing belief that the qualities desirable in a manager are uni-
versal and a good executive can manage any business in any
situation is not consistent with the increasingly complex man-
agement required in large corporations in a world of new orga-
nizational forms and structures. Even CEOs in different firms in
the same industry may need very different skills and personal
styles to succeed (Gerstein and Reisman, 1983; Fernandez-Araoz
2005).
The inference problem and Knightian uncertainty
The recognition that different organizations have different needs
in different situations means that before choosing a leader the
group making the selection must make some determination of the
future environment in which the organization is likely to operate
and the characteristics of the leader that are required for that
environment. These determinations depend critically on whether
the environment is primarily characterized by risk or by uncer-
tainty; as will be seen, this distinction is also closely linked to the
stability of the environment in which the organization is
operating.
Risk environments are ones where the probabilities of events
can be determined from evidence or deductive reasoning (Knight,
1921). In such situations, the use of evidence or deduction can be
used to achieve a fairly high degree of agreement over the like-
lihood of events; these probabilities in turn can be used to make
decisions based on mathematical expected outcomes. Risk
environments are stable environments. In a stable environment it
is possible to determine that, for instance, conditions are
favourable p percent of the time and unfavourable 1-p percent of
the time. These probabilities can then be used to guide decisions
today, such as investments or the hiring of a leader, that have
effects well into the future.
Uncertain environments are ones where probabilities cannot be
determined from evidence or deductive reasoning. Unstable
environments are uncertain environments—when the underlying
structure of a system is changing or has recently changed, it is not
possible to give meaningful statements about the probability of
certain events occurring. In fact, it may not even be possible to
outline the set of possibilities that could occur, never mind their
likelihood of occurrence. In order to make decisions today that
have long-lasting impacts, people in these situations must rely on
inference—on the creation of simplifying patterns—for their
determination of what the future holds (Loasby, 2001).
The simplifying patterns that we make often take the form of
narratives, stories about cause and effect (Lo, 2017; see Shiller
(2017) for a review of some of the literature on narratives). While
the simplifying patterns can be made explicit—e.g., as in the
construction and estimation of formal models—they can also be
take the form of intuition. Simon (1987, 1992), for instance, links
intuition with the recall of patterns. This recognition model
requires two conditions for skilled decision-making: (1) the
existence of valid—or predictive—cues that provide information
about the situation; and (2) sufficient opportunity for people to
learn the appropriate cues. The first of these conditions requires
that the situation be relatively stable and not too complex
(Kahneman and Klein, 2009).
A reliance on inference in environments of uncertainty, how-
ever, means that individuals are likely to differ in the narratives
they have constructed and hence in their views about how the
future is likely to unfold (Richardson, 1953). At their core, these
differences amount to differences in the simplifying patterns—the
cognitive mappings—that people impose on the complexity of the
world and that they project into the future (Loasby, 2001). These
cognitive mappings differ because of philosophical outlook, per-
sonal experience and identity, cultural background, cognitive
capabilities, recent stimuli and so forth.
Given these different inferences about the future, there will, in
turn, be differences among people regarding the desirable char-
acteristics of the leader. Consider, for instance, the hiring of a
university president. Even though the search committee members
have access to the same information and have the same goal for
their university (e.g., to maintain or increase its ranking in edu-
cation, research and scholarship), one committee member might,
on the basis of their inference about the future, argue for someone
that excels in making connections with industry and government,
while another, based on their inferences, might argue for some-
one that excels in fostering faculty relations. Thus, in the presence
of uncertainty, there will be disagreements over “What is best?” In
short, there will not be agreement on the necessary characteristics
of the desirable hire nor will everyone have the same quality
ranking of these characteristics even if agreement were achieved.
Determining “what is best?”
In situations where people rely on their own individual inferences
about the future, it matters which person—and thus which
interpretative system—makes decisions (Richardson, 1953). The
choice of who makes the “What is best?” decision—i.e., the
decision as to which characteristics are important and their
relative ranking—is determined by two things—the nature of the
people who have been appointed to the hiring committee and the
decision-making structure of the group that has been given the
authority to make the hiring decision.
The composition of the hiring group determines the mix of
those making the hiring decision. If this group is heavily weighted
with people that have a particular view of the future—a particular
narrative—then it is more likely that the leader chosen will reflect
this view (Zajac and Westphal, 1996; see Kaplan (2008) for an
example of a contest over the way a problem is framed). The
decision-making structure of the hiring group is determined by
the culture and practices of the organization. Included among the
common decision-making structures are the following: (1) one
person is either given or assumes authority; (2) the group
members must reach unanimity; (3) the group relies on majority
or supramajority voting; (4) the group uses some other form of
positional weighting formula such as the Borda Count; and (5)
the group members engage in negotiation, with the final result
involving some sort of compromise.
Each of these processes has its strengths and weaknesses.
Relying on one person to make the decision can result in quick
decisions at little direct cost of money or time. However, while
significant organizational success can be had occasionally with
cognitive mappings based on the insights of a single person, long-
term success is directly linked to the ability of a mapping to be
influenced by diverse viewpoints (March, 1991; Page, 2008).
Unanimity typically requires a great deal of time and effort,
particularly when there is substantial diversity (Hansmann, 1988),
and may result in a decision not being made. Majority and
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supermajority rules are easy to apply, but can be subject to
strategic manipulation, cyclic behaviour, and reversals if some
candidates are dropped from the ballot. Although such paradoxes
are not present with the Borda Count (Saari, 2006), positional
ranking requires more time and effort on the part of committee
members. Negotiation can result in a balancing and integration of
different cognitive views, which in turn can generate simplifying
patterns that better position the organization to succeed. Bar-
gaining could also result in the hiring of a “Jack of all trades and a
master of none,” with the result that none of the key character-
istics chosen are ideally suited for the situation that does occur.
Not only will different hiring group memberships and
decision-making processes lead to very different people being
hired, it is virtually certain that there will always be people who
believe that the person hired is not “the best person for the job.”
While some reconciliation in views can and does occur through
better information and communication, it is important to
recognize that some differences are irreconcilable and are
inherent in the nature of the hiring process.
Indeed, one of the key conclusions of this paper is that hiring
leaders in unstable environments has the inherent potential to
involve conflict. When the environment is relatively stable, the
answer to the “What is best?” question can likely be agreed to by
the committee members (this assumes that other differences
between the hiring committee members are minimal—see below),
leaving only the information asymmetry problems to be
addressed through the use of screening, signaling and various
types of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives. However, when the
environment is changing or has recently changed significantly,
then agreement on the “What is best?” question could be
difficult to achieve. As Eisenhardt (1999, p 68) says, “In dynamic
markets, conflict is a natural feature of high-stakes decision
making because reasonable managers will often diverge in their
views on how the marketplace will unfold.” This comment, of
course, applies to the members of any group (such as a hiring
committee) that is making decisions in a rapidly changing
environment.
Conflict can be either detrimental or advantageous to the
organization operating in a high velocity environment (one that is
changing rapidly), depending on how it is managed and the form
it takes. If conflict is combined with the centralization of power,
the outcome is often not the full sharing of information in open
forums, but instead takes the form of politics—the withholding of
information, the forming of coalitions behind the scenes, and the
controlling of agendas—which in turn result in poorer perfor-
mance (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988).
However, conflict need not always be detrimental to perfor-
mance—in fact, better decisions may often arise if the views
behind the conflict can be given full expression and consideration.
Diverse individuals can come up with more varied viewpoints and
solutions (Page, 2008), frame-breaking techniques help establish a
norm that constructive conflict is expected, and multiple alter-
natives can lead to better understanding of the options and the
confidence that superior options have not been overlooked
(Eisenhardt, 1999).
The form of the conflict is also important. Cognitive conflict
arises from perceptual differences and is usually thought to be
beneficial because contested views typically give rise to better
synthesis. In contrast, affective conflict, which is focused on
personal incompatibilities and disputes, and is emotional in
nature, often leads to poorer outcomes as a result of a lack of
consensus and affective acceptance (Amason, 1996).
The negative impact of affective conflict may be one reason
that fairness is important in situations where there is disagree-
ment over the outcome. Research in equity theory and organi-
zational justice indicates that people will accept unfavourable
decisions if they feel the process was fair and just (Adams, 1965;
Colquitt, 2001; Grimes, 2006). One reason for this acceptance
might be that affective conflict is reduced when the process is
perceived as being fair. Nevertheless, regardless of how the hiring
committee composition and selection procedures are determined,
it is important that the process for selection be one that has
widespread support and is seen as being fair and transparent.
The allocation of authority in the hiring process can have a
direct impact on the kind of leader, with the kind of leader
chosen being dependent on which individuals and groups have
the most influence in the hiring process (Zajac and Westphal,
1996). The chosen leader, of course, plays a key role in the
authority structure of the organization in the future; thus,
authority structures over time are often linked, which in turn can
give rise to the maintenance of power and authority relationships
and path dependence (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2004). The resulting
tendency to maintain the status quo might be particularly
costly to organizations operating in environments that are
changing rapidly, since the reproduction of authority relation-
ships may coincide with an inability to update cognitive map-
pings of the future.
The discussion above highlights the importance of the com-
position of the hiring committee and the decision-making pro-
cess. Since the decisions on these two features are typically made
elsewhere in the organization, either through organizational or
cultural norms, or through the authority granted to particular
office holders, there is often little that a hiring committee can do
to address these issues. Instead, the issues discussed in this section
are likely ones that need to be understood at the organizational
level and dealt with by those with the power and authority to
make changes.
Other sources of disagreement
There are, of course, other sources of disagreement among those
making hiring decisions in addition to those stemming from the
inference problem. An important source is self-interest. Since
hiring often involves conflicts of interest (e.g., the hiring of
someone who has personal or family connections, or the hiring of
someone who would take the organization in a direction bene-
ficial to some individuals and not to others), hiring is likely to be
subject to the same problems that arise in other conflict-of-
interest situations. As a result, hiring decisions can be egocentric
and involve post hoc rationalizations of previously determined
positions (Haidt, 2001; Epley and Caruso, 2004; Moore and
Loewenstein, 2004; Chugh, et al. 2005; Tenbrunsel and Smith-
Crowe, 2008). Thus, in addition to reflecting fundamentally dif-
ferent cognitive views of the world, disagreements among mem-
bers of the hiring group may also represent the expression of self-
serving objectives that are being argued as points of logic but that
ultimately cannot be reconciled in this manner.
The difficulty in reconciling opposing views of the organization
and where it should be headed is made worse by the traps and
pitfalls that exist within the hiring and decision making processes.
Some of these traps can be viewed as the result of heuristics or
biases—cognitive short cuts that have been introduced to save
time and deliberation, albeit at the cost of more fully processing
the available information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Conlisk,
1996; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). These traps include: searching
for someone similar to the person who has left but without his/
her weaknesses; taking references at face value; overrating people
that are similar to you; lacking the proper hiring skills; delegating
the hiring decision to those without the knowledge of what the
job requires; carrying out unstructured interviews that fail to
reveal pertinent information; ignoring emotional intelligence; and
facing political pressure to hire friends or weak candidates
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(Latham et al. 1975; Gerstein and Reisman, 1983, Zajac and
Westphal, 1996; Fernandez-Araoz, 2005).
While these sources of disagreement are detrimental to an
organization and need to be minimized, this need not be the case
with conflict that results from the inference problem. Instead,
conflict that arises from differences in inference can be beneficial
to an organization, providing it is dealt with in a way that reduces
affective conflict. Since self-interest/heuristic conflict and affective
conflict are likely to be linked (self-serving behaviour or beha-
viour based on an outdated heuristic, for instance, are likely to
result in personal criticism by others and hence affective conflict),
the reduction of self-interest/heuristic conflict can be expected to
further enhance the beneficial impact of conflict that arises from
different inferences.
Success in hiring
The above factors notwithstanding, success in hiring requires that
the people making the hiring decision use inferences about the
future to determine the desirable characteristics required of the
person being hired. Since the future cannot be perfectly foreseen
at the time the hiring decision is made, the success of the hiring
process always involves an element of luck, a roll of the dice.
Given this, are screening and incentive schemes irrelevant, for
instance? Do neither the committee structure nor the agreed-
upon rules matter? Clearly they do. Successful screening and the
provision of appropriate intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are
obviously necessary for the hiring of the desirable “high quality
type” (once the “What is best?” question has been answered), and
to prompt successful candidates to give their best efforts once
they are in the job. However, neither successful screening nor the
introduction of proper incentives is sufficient for a successful hire.
In addition, no single committee structure or decision-making
rule will ensure success.
While those involved in the hiring process will have different
views, steps can be taken to improve the hiring process. In
addition to being made aware of the traps that exist in the hiring
process so that they can be avoided (Fernandez-Araoz, 2005),
groups involved in hiring would benefit from the use of an
“outside view” that makes use of analogous reference classes; in
the case of hiring, this would mean other hires that have taken
place in comparable organizations (Lovallo and Kahneman 2003).
Another way is to take deliberate steps to create a hiring culture
that encourages a balanced, thoughtful and impartial style of
judgment (Haidt, 2001).
It is important that the hiring process requires that those
making the decisions develop a clear idea of what the organiza-
tion needs, using whatever process they choose (e.g., SWOT
analysis, strategic planning). At least three issues emerge in this
regard. The first is that people often rearrange their preferences
over the characteristics as they choose the candidate—one pos-
sible source of the preference rearrangement is cognitive dis-
sonance (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Festinger, 1957). Thus, if a
candidate with characteristic A is available, then characteristic A
becomes more highly ranked. The result is that there is agreement
on a candidate, but the candidate is likely to lack the character-
istics that are really important. To guard against this possibility, it
is critical that a direction for the organization be selected and that
the candidates be constantly compared to how well they would
advance this direction.
The second issue is that failure to determine a direction—even
a disputed one—means that it will be the candidates who will
answer the “What is best?” question. In such a situation it is very
difficult to evaluate candidates properly and the likelihood will be
small that the chosen candidate has the characteristics necessary
for the organization to succeed. Once again, the need to select a
clear direction for the organization is critical.
A third issue arises from some of the earlier analysis in the
paper. If there are differences in beliefs and hence conflict over
“What is best?,” it may be important that the selection processes
in the committee do not overly concentrate power. As was dis-
cussed, concentrating power can lead to activities, such as the
withholding of information and the formation of coalitions,
which ultimately lead to poorer decisions about “What is best?” If
the concentration of power can be avoided and if conflict can take
the form of cognitive conflict rather than affective conflict, then
organizational performance may be enhanced. To do this requires
that the process be perceived as fair. One process that appears to
be effective in dealing with these myriad issues is “consensus with
qualification.” In this process, a serious attempt to reach a con-
sensus is made; however, if consensus does not occur then there is
a previously established fallback process that can be used to make
a decision—e.g., the chair decides, or a specified voting rule is
used (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988, p 752).
Consensus with qualification has the potential to generate
more perspectives, which, if they are properly argued with well-
understood premises, can produce better decisions regarding the
characteristics of the best leader. For this process to work, how-
ever, the members of the group have to believe that the fallback
position is a last resort. Without this belief, the members of the
hiring group are unlikely to work hard at integrating the different
perspectives and arriving at a consensus. As well, it may be more
likely that the conflict will become affective in nature, thus
negatively affecting performance.
The belief held by the committee members regarding the
likelihood that the fallback position will be invoked is influenced
by the power of the leaders in both the group and the larger
organization. The greater is the power of these leaders, the more
likely it is that the committee members will believe that the lea-
ders will make the final decision. Once again, it is the distribution
of power and authority along with the presence of conflict that
results in poor organizational performance. Thus, in conditions of
Knightian uncertainty, where conflict is more prevalent, it is
important for an organization not to fall back on centralizing
power since doing so is likely to make the organization less
effective at addressing this uncertainty.
Conclusion
The key insight of this paper is that conflict and disagreement
about the “best person for the job” are an expected outcome of
the hiring process in environments of Knightian uncertainty, even
when those involved share the same goals for the organization.
Moreover, hiring always involves an element of chance.
The way to address the conflict and to minimize the likelihood
of poor outcomes is to use the different inferences that create this
conflict to develop a better understanding of the environment and
improve the hiring decisions. However, to do so requires a sincere
acknowledgement of the benefits that different perspectives bring
and a commitment by the organization not to overly centralize
power, since the centralization of power, in conjunction with
conflict, can be detrimental to organizational behaviour. How-
ever, since power and authority are determined dynamically over
time within the organization, they cannot be unilaterally altered
every time a leader is being hired. Instead, coping with the
challenges posed by the idiosyncratic nature of inference can only
take place over long periods of time via processes that people
believe are stable and in which power is not overly centralized,
self-interest is discouraged, and diversity is valued for the
potential benefits it creates.
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